| | This paper, ‘Explaining Al-Qaida’s Continued Appeal’, by Dr Brynjar Lia (pictured), Research Professor at the Norwegian Defense Research Institute, analyses factors that have contributed to Al Qa’ida’s continued appeal among some Muslims across the globe.
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Dr Lia argues Al Qaida’s appeal can be narrowed down to three key factors: - Propagating ‘a simple, popular message’
- Creating and maintaining 'a powerful and captivating image’
- Espousing 'a global character’
Dr Lia writes:
‘…al-Qaida has consistently rallied its followers around a simple populist pan-Islamic message, which is that “Islam is under attack”, militarily, religiously, and economically. Al-Qaida has focused almost exclusively on the foreign or “Crusader” occupation of Muslim land, foreign desecration of Islam’s holiest places, and how foreigners plunder the Islamic world’s natural resources, especially oil.’
Explaining al Qaida’s focus and how it differs from prior movements of similar character, Lia argues:
‘This choice of focus on foreign occupation, religious desecration and economic imperialism is not coincidental. Al-Qaida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, has written extensively on why this choice of focus is so important for al-Qaida. He correctly observes that very few Muslim youth will sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic utopian state. Many more, however, are willing to die for al-Aqsa, and to sacrifice themselves for liberating Palestine or other countries under occupation such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Al-Suri’s conclusion is that Muslims are deeply touched by anything that smacks of foreign occupation. Hence, he urges al-Qaida to harness the power of pan-Islamic sentiments and the strength of popular Muslim solidarity in order to rally a mass following.
‘Al-Qaida’s simple message of foreign occupation, desecration and exploitation seems to resonate deeply among Muslims today. The reason for this is simple: there is some truth to it. The Western world, led by the United States, has a strong and visible presence in this part of the world, militarily, economically and politically. There are US-led military coalitions occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States support Israel militarily and economically and politically even if the latter continues to maintain an illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. The ruling elites in many Muslim countries are not elected, corruption is widespread, and there is a widespread belief – right or wrong – that the United States keeps these regimes in power to secure its access to the region’s oil reserves. The list of widely shared popular grievances against the United States’ foreign policies in the Islamic world is very long. Hence, it is very easy for al-Qaida to find good arguments for its propaganda messages.’
Lia comments on probable developments that may see the slow dissipation of al Qaida as a rallying cry and force for the disillusioned. He writes:
‘At some point, al-Qaida’s image will inevitably fade; all extremist ideologies have a limited life span, so does al-Qaida’s extremist interpretation of Islam. Some time in the future, al-Qaida will loose its attraction among the youth, and to pose as a jihadist will no longer be ”cool”.
‘At the same time, the ‘Obama factor’ has greatly improved the image of the United States internationally and undermines the credibility of al-Qaida’s hate propaganda.
'It may be that the lack of political visions in al-Qaida will doom the organisation before it loses its captivating image. Already, we find that opinion polls in the Middle Eastern countries show that people only support al-Qaida because it is anti-American.
‘Even if the sympathy for al-Qaida appears to be on the wane and its ideological message has come under attacks, the organisation will continue to enjoy a degree of support. The Gaza war earlier this year was clearly a vitamin injection to al-Qaida’s propaganda campaign. More generally, as long as the United States and its Western allies continue to maintain a strong and high-profile military, political and economic presence in the Islamic world, al-Qaida is ensured a certain minimum level of support.’
Lia remarks on the ‘inherent weakness of al-Qaida: namely its unwillingness to prepare for a future transition to politics.’
The movement’s singular preoccupation with violence, Lia claims, will ultimately weaken its hold over those who prefer to engage in politics and not violence to attain their ends.
Two observations on Lia’s analysis: - He correctly attributes Al Qaida’s success in propagating its simple, popular message of ‘Islam under siege’ to western policies in the Middle East and the widespread perception of hypocrisy and double standards. The notion that foreign policy plays no role in radicalising Muslims is patently absurd.
- His comments on the important role a transition to politics will play in undercutting and diminishing Al Qaida’s appeal is instructive for the questions it gives rise to. Namely, will the transition be supported or itself undermined through attempts to circumscribe its scope? That is, will we hand Al Qaida another ‘vitamin injection’ through our own ‘ideological missteps’ of attempting to engage only those factions that articulate a secular politics?
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